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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Melvin Dean Hanks appeals from the

prejudice his petition for post-conviction

by dismissing

Statement

district court’s

judgment dismissing With

Hanks argues

that the district court erred

relief.

his petition Without an evidentiary hearing.

Of The

In 1984,

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Melvin Dean Hanks was sentenced

to “the determinate

term 0f

life,

pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-25 13A, for the crime of kidnapping in the ﬁrst degree.” (R.,

Hanks did not appeal from

pp.22-23 (capitalization altered).)

the imposition of that

sentence. (R., p.12.)

In 1985,

the

ﬁxed

life

Hanks ﬁled a motion

sentence

is

Hanks ﬁled a

is

In 1990,

33.)

He

year.

.

.

life

“He argued

that

(R., p.5 1.)

The

sentence as the

not supported in the record.” (R., pp.51-52.)

petition for post-conviction relief.

Idaho 153, 153, 823 P.2d 187, 187 (Ct. App. 1992).

same

.”
.

argument: “the consideration 0f the ﬁxed

equivalent 0f a thirty year sentence[]

petition that

(R., p.48.)

legally interpreted as a thirty year sentence

district court rejected his

In 1988,

to reduce his sentence.

The

E

Hanks

district court

V. State,

121

dismissed the

I_d.

Hanks ﬁled a successive

argued that his determinate

under the Eighth Amendment.

life

petition for post-conviction relief.

(R.,

pp.328—

sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment

(R., pp.330-31.)

In his

sworn

petition,

Hanks

stated that

“[t]he duration 0f a sentence 0f a determinate life term is the full natural life of the inmate.”

(R.,

pp.33 1-32.) The

district court

dismissed Hanks’s petition as untimely. (R., p.372.)

In 2016,

Hanks ﬁled another petition

claimed that his sentence for “determinate

life” actually

View, his sentence had expired. (R., p.12.) The state
the basis

that

meant thirty years and thus,

moved

for

summary

in his

disposition

The

(R., pp.373-75.)

state relied

0n Hanks’s prior post-

conviction petition in Which he admitted, in a sworn statement, that his determinate

sentence meant the

term of his natural

full

on

criminal proceeding and subsequent proceedings

the record of the

contradicted Hanks’s claim.

He

for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.1 1-14.)

life.

(R., pp.373-75.)

The

state also

life

argued that

the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel barred Hanks’s claim. (7/30/2018 T11, p.5, Ls.19-21.)

Hanks responded
sister.

(R., pp.384-85.)

t0 the state’s

Hanks’s

and, While “[s]he does not

remembers the Judge saying
prison.”

sister stated in

remember

that there

Hanks argued

(R., p.384.)

material fact as t0 Whether

motion by presenting an afﬁdavit from Hanks’s
her afﬁdavit that she attended sentencing

the exact

words spoken by the Judge,

would be a day that Melvin Hanks would

[she]

get out of

that his sister’s afﬁdavit created a genuine issue

Hanks was sentenced

t0

spend his

full natural life in

0f

prison 0r

just thirty years in prison. (R., pp.379-82.)

Although the

district court

found

“all the

elements of judicial estoppel” were not

satisﬁed (R., p.393), the district court dismissed Hank’s petition for post-conviction relief

With prejudice (R., pp.390-98). The
claim that ‘determinate
(R., p.392.)

life’

really

district court

meant ‘30

And the district court found,

that the sentence

was determinate

was ﬁxed
life.”

life”

years’

when

the petitioner

was sentenced.”

as a factual matter, that “the Court record is clear

because “[e]very court document indicates the sentence

(R., p.394.)

Hanks timely appealed.

found “[t]here simply is n0 legal basis t0

(R., pp.400-03.)

ISSUES
Hanks

states the issue

on appeal

as:

the district court error [sic] in summarily dismissing Mr. Hanks’

Did

petition for post-conviction relief because there is an issue of material fact
as to

whether his sentence as orally pronounced has expired?

(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Hanks

failed t0

show

that the district court erred

when

it

dismissed with

prejudice his petition for post-conviction relief?

II.

Did

the district court abuse

ofjudicial estoppel?

its

discretion

when

it

refused to invoke the doctrine

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Hanks’s Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction

The

district court

properly dismissed Hanks’s petition for post-conviction relief 0n

the basis that the record clearly disproved Hanks’s claim.

Hanks claimed that his sentence

had expired because he received only a thirty-year sentence for ﬁrst—degree kidnapping.
But, as the district court found, “[e]very court document indicates the sentence

determinate

life.”

(R., p.394.)

Hanks tried to
his sister.

Hanks’s

by

create a genuine issue of material fact

(R., pp.395-96.)

admitted in the afﬁdavit that she “does not remember the exact words spoken

the Judge” at sentencing.

(R., p.395.)

recollection that the judge said “there

prison.”

by presenting an afﬁdavit from

Yet the afﬁdavit “has no statement of What the sentence was.”

sister

was

(R., p.395.)

judgment, the same

Instead, she relies

would be a day that Melvin Hanks would

That unsubstantiated recollection

district

0n her (admittedly ﬂawed)

is

contradicted

by

get out 0f

the written

judge’s near-contemporaneous ruling on Hanks’s Rule 35

motion, and Hanks’s prior petition for post—conviction

disproved Hanks’s claim, the

district court

relief.

did not err

Because the record clearly

by dismissing

it

without an

evidentiary hearing.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“On review 0f

a dismissal 0f a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue 0f fact exists based

0n the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any afﬁdavits 0n ﬁle and

Will

liberally construe the facts

Charboneau

C.

in favor

of the non-moving party.”

144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).

Hanks Failed T0 Create A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact On The
Whether He Had Been Sentenced To Thirty Years Or Fixed Life
The

An

V. State,

and reasonable inferences

district court

properly dismissed Hanks’s petition for post-conviction

“applicant for post—conviction relief must prove

allegations

144 Idaho

upon which the application
903, 174 P.3d at 873.

at

Issue

other evidence supporting

its

by

Of

relief.

a preponderance 0f evidence the

for post-conviction relief is based.”

Charboneau,

“The application must include afﬁdavits, records, or

allegations, 0r

must

state

Why

such supporting evidence

is

not included.” LC. § 19-4903.

“Summary

disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief

applicant’s evidence raises

(c).

“A

court

is

n0 genuine issue 0f material

fact.”

I_d.;

is

ﬂ

appropriate if the

LC.

§ 19-4906(b),

required to accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but need

not accept the petitioner’s conclusions.” Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d at 873.

The

district court

may dismiss

an application for post-conviction relief Without holding an

evidentiary hearing where the allegations “are clearly disproved
original proceeding” 0r

“do not justify relief as a matter of law.”

by

the record of the

I_d.

Here, the district court properly dismissed Hanks’s petition because the allegation
in his petition that

record.”

he had only been sentenced t0

The Judgment 0f Conviction

Li.

stated that the district court sentenced

Idaho Code

§

Hanks

was

“clearly disproved

Hanks attached

to “the determinate

And When Hanks

term of life, pursuant to

tried t0 tell the district

Who imposed the sentence—that his “ﬁxed life

by the

t0 his petition expressly

19-2513A, for the crime of kidnapping in the ﬁrst degree.”

(capitalization altered).)

district judge

that

thirty years

(R.,

pp.45-46

court—the very same

sentence

is

legally interpreted

as a thirty year sentence” (R., p.51), the district court

found the argument “[was] not

supported in the record” (R., p.52). Thus, the record clearly shows not only that the
court actually sentenced

to

d0

so.

Hanks

to “the determinate

term of life” but that

it

district

fully intended

(R., p.52.)

Furthermore, Hanks himself conﬁrmed those facts in a sworn statement. In a prior
petition

for post-conviction relief,

Hanks

stated that he

had been sentenced

to

a

“[d]eterminate term of life” and explained that “[t]he duration of a sentence of a

determinate

life

term

the full natural life of the inmate.”

is

(R.,

pp.329, 331-32.)

“being ﬁrst duly sworn 0n oath, [Hanks] depose[d] and state[d]” that he

And,

knew

the

“contents” of the petition and “believe[d] the same to be true.” (R., p.333.)
In the face 0f this decisive evidence,

that,

“While perhaps not merely conclusory,

(R., p.395.1)

1

“It

says merely that her

In the district court,

Hanks

(“Fixed Life Sentence Not

p.128 (“Determinate

life

is

memory

tried to rely

arraignment that indicated his ﬁxed

Hanks produced an afﬁdavit from

as unpersuasive as a conclusory affidavit.”

is

different

after the fact.

from what the documents and

on a commitment order and minutes of

his

life

sentence should not exceed thirty years. (R., pp.93

T0 Exceed

Thirty (30) years at full term release date.”); R.,

not to exceed thirty years.”).) But the state presented the district

court with certiﬁed copies 0f those documents that

added

his sister

showed those statements had been

(R., pp.285-89.) The state asserted that Hanks “committed a fraud

upon this court by providing falsiﬁed documents.” (R., p.283.) Hanks conceded that there
were “some extraneous annotations typed in” but said he “cannot prove who put those
there” and “cannot say with any reliability how truthful or correct they are.” (7/30/2018
The district court’s order dismissing Hanks’s petition makes no
T11, p.21, Ls.14-22.)
mention 0f the documents. (R., pp.390-96.) Regardless of how those statements ended up
in Hanks’s copies of those documents, on appeal Hanks notes the existence 0f those
documents in the facts section of his brief (Appellant’s brief, pp.1-2, 4), but he does not
use them to advance his argument (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-15). Given Hanks’s admission
that the documents are not reliable and his decision not t0 rely 0n the documents 0n appeal,
this

Court should not consider Hanks’s version 0f those documents.

admissions from her brother say, while conceding the (understandable) defects of her

memory.”

(R., p.395.)

Put differently, the afﬁdavit does not support Hanks’s claim that his sentence has
expired because

it

does not say when Hanks’s sentence expires.

afﬁdavit simply states that Hanks’s sister “does not

And her recollection that the

the Judge.” (R., p.384.)

day

that

remember

Melvin Hanks would get out 0f prison”

(R., p.384.)

the exact

words spoken by

district court said “there

contradicted

is

by

Instead, the

would be a

the available court

records from the time and Hanks’s sworn statement from his prior post-conviction petition.

(R., p.384.)

Thus, as the

ofmaterial fact because

0f the afﬁant’s

it

district court

“is a

memory more

found, the afﬁdavit does not create a genuine issue

bare allegation unsubstantiated by facts” and “is a statement

than a statement 0f What the sentencing judge said.”

(R.,

pp.395-96.)

On

appeal,

Hanks

recollection as his sister.

tries t0 bolster his sister’s

(Appellant’s brief, p.1

afﬁdavit

1 .)

But

if

by claiming he had

the

same

he had such a recollection, he

did not present evidence 0f it t0 the district court. His petition and accompanying afﬁdavit

do not say anything about Hanks recalling what the

(E

R., pp.1 1-16,

determinate

life

77-82.)

Instead,

district court said at his sentencing.

both documents simply argued that legally a

mean

sentence was understood t0

thirty years in

proposition for which he provides Virtually zero support.

Hanks has

tried to

prison—a separate

(E R., pp.1 1-16.)

paint a picture 0f a tumultuous legal landscape where

“prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges

.

.

.

believed that a

life

sentence meant thirty

years.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) But he quickly ran out 0f paint. His only support for his

assertion

is

State V. Wilson, 105 Idaho 669,

672 P.2d 237

(Ct.

App. 1983), and Wilson

identiﬁed only two or three people

who

supposedly held that View: “counsel for both

m,

Wilson brothers[] and the prosecuting attorney.”
243.

These two 0r three individuals apparently

sorts:

they mistakenly reasoned that

the Idaho

Supreme Court had

were effectively

life

Furthermore,

m

all

ﬁxed

fell

105 Idaho

675, 672 P.2d at

prey to a false conversion fallacy 0f

sentences must be thirty years because

life

said (in the context of parole) that

sentences.

at

all

thirty-year sentences

mQ

makes

clear that,

by the time Hanks was sentenced,

the Idaho

Court 0f Appeals had already rejected that unconventional View and the Idaho Attorney
General had already published an opinion rejecting

672 P.2d

at

243-44.

shortly after

As Hanks notes,

Hanks was sentenced

the Idaho

Hanks leaves

in this case in

out,

which
V.

More
Hanks ’s
life

case.

life.”

I_d.

The

district

in

675-76,

M1

“reverse[d]” the decision of the

however, that the Idaho Supreme Court,
life

like the

sentence as a sentence for “the

509, 690 P.2d at 1341.

importantly, the record here conclusively

judge

who

shows there was n0 confusion

in

sentenced Hanks found the View that a determinate

sentence meant thirty years in prison “[Was] not supported in the record.” (R., p.52.)

And there is nothing in the
a determinate

prisoner.

§

at

it

at

Wilson, 107 Idaho 506, 508, 690 P.2d

Idaho Court of Appeals, clearly Viewed a determinate
duration 0f one’s

105 Idaho

Supreme Court issued a decision

Idaho Court 0f Appeals on other grounds. State
1338, 1340 (1984).

E m,

it.

m

19—2513A).

life

sentencing statute employed

by the

district court to

suggest that

sentence meant anything other than a sentence for the natural

State V.

life

of the

Rawson, 100 Idaho 308, 31 1, 597 P.2d 31, 34 (1979) (quoting LC.

Hanks asks
0n a telephone
‘determinate

this

call

life

Court to ignore the

ﬁxed

life

ﬁnding because

With a prison administrator rather than

term.” (Appellant’s

brief, p.12.)

court consulted the prison administrator,

the

district court’s

it

That

is

its

0f Conviction signed by that same

memory of

inaccurate.

“was based
the phrase

While the

district

also expressly found that “the consideration 0f

sentence as the equivalent 0f a thirty year sentence[]

record.” (R., p.52 (emphasis added).)

it

And “the record”

district judge.

is

not supported in the

included the Judgment and Order

(E R., pp.44-46.)

Citing Ebersole V. State, 91 Idaho 630, 428 P.2d 947 (1967),

Hanks claims a due

process Violation because n0 transcript or minutes from his original sentencing hearing

could be found. (Appellant’s

brief, p.1 1.)

from the

district court’s failure t0

Idaho

636, 428 P.2d at 953.

at

But the due process Violation

make any record of the

in Ebersole arose

defendant’s arraignment.

91

Here, however, the only failure, if any, was the failure of

the district court t0 preserve the transcript or minutes for thirty—ﬁve years

not appeal the sentencing decision in the ﬁrst place.
available because the matter

E

(R.,

was not appealed and

Furthermore, unlike in Ebersole where the

it

when Hanks

did

pp.393-94 (“N0 transcript

was over 3O years

district court failed t0

make any

is

ago.”).)

record 0f the

proceedings, here the district court memorialized the sentencing proceeding in the written

judgment.

(R.,

pp.2 1 -23 .)

And Hanks indisputably had the written judgment When crafting

his post-conviction claim. (R., pp.21-23.)

Finally,

Hanks

also argues that this Court should resolve the alleged ambiguity in

his sentence in his favor to avoid an Eighth

Amendment

punishment because “[W]hen interpreting ambiguous

Violation for cruel and unusual

statutes,

courts

must seek an

interpretation that avoids constitutional inﬁrmity.”

This

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

argument suffers from a litany of problems.
First, as

explained above, there

is

nothing ambiguous about Hanks’s sentence. The

record clearly proves that the district court sentenced Hanks to a determinate

and

that both the district court

natural

life.

and Hanks understood

(R., pp.52, 329-31.)

Second,

that t0

mean the

Third,

Hanks

constitutional challenge t0 his sentence.

E

for a petition for post—conviction relief at

appeal).

In fact,

Hanks already

untimely—twenty—nine years ago.
(Ct.

duration of Hanks’s

is

about thirty years too

LC.

§

(E

ambiguous.
late t0

raise a

19-4902 (1979) (setting the deadline

ﬁve years from

the expiration of the time for

asserted this very constitutional challenge t0 his sentence

in a prior post-conviction petition,

823 P.2d 187, 189

is

sentence

not a case 0f statutory interpretation

this is

because Hanks has not even argued that any relevant statute
Appellant’s brief, pp.1-15.)

life

and the

district

(R., pp.371-72);

ﬂ

court dismissed the petition as

Hanks V.

State, 121

Idaho 153, 155,

App. 1992) (“Hanks was barred from making an application

post-conviction relief more than ﬁve years after

November

22, 1984.”). Fourth, and

for

most

problematic for Hanks, a sentence of life without the possibility 0f parole for ﬁrst-degree

kidnapping does not Violate the Eighth Amendment.
accordance With statutory provisions,

life

ﬂ

51 C.J.S. Kidnapping § 49 (“In

imprisonment Without possibility of parole

be imposed on conviction for kidnapping”);

ﬂ alﬂ

10

State V. King,

may

518 S.E.2d 663, 668-

71 (W. Va. 1999) (holding “sentence[] of life without mercy for kidnapping” did not Violate
the Eighth

Amendment

0r

its

counterpart in the

West Virginia Constitution)?

In sum, the district court properly dismissed Hanks’s petition for post-conviction

relief

on the basis

that

Hanks’s claim that his sentence expired was “clearly disproved by

the record.” Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d at 873.

II.

The
A.

Abused

District Court

Its

Discretion

BV Refusing To

Invoke Judicial Estoppel

Introduction

The

state also asserted a

second theory under Which the

district court

dismissed Hanks’s petition: judicial estoppel. (R., p.386.) While the
t0

apply judicial estoppel,

this

by the record and preserved

Court can afﬁrm the

in the district court.

271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017)
correct but based

upon an erroneous

district court

E

(“It is true that

ﬂ

Garcia—Rodriguez, 162 Idaho

where an order of the

addressed the issue (R., p.393),

district court

P.3d 683, 689 (2019).

Hanks took a position

The

district court

in this petition that

ﬂ

district court is

afﬁrm upon the

was preserved in the

district court (R., p.386;

at

refused

State V. Garcia—Rodriguez, 162 Idaho

theory.” (internal quotations omitted». Judicial estoppel

p.5, Ls.19-21),

district court

0n any theory supported

legal theory, this Court Will

both because the state presented that theory in the

should have

275, 396 P.3d

at

correct

district court

7/30/2018

Tr.,

704, and because the

State V. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 868,

436

should have invoked judicial estoppel because

was incompatible with a

position he took in a

prior petition.

2

The United

States

committed homicide

ﬂ

Supreme Court has held
to

life

that sentencing a juvenile

has not

without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth

Graham V. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010), but the district
Hanks’s sentence When Hanks was forty-one years 01d (R., pp.1 1, 56).

Amendment,

who

11

court imposed

B.

Standard

Of Review

This Court reviews a
for an abuse

of discretion.

district court’s decision

m

Watkins

V.

0n whether t0 invoke judicial estoppel

Watkins, 162 Idaho 600, 608, 402 P.3d 1053,

1061 (2017).

C.

The

District Court

Should Have Invoked Judicial Estoppel Because Hanks Took A

Position In This Petition Incompatible

The

district court

With

A Position He Took In The Past

should have invoked the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel. “Judicial

estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position, then subsequently

seeking a second position that

incompatible with the ﬁrst.” Hoagland

is

“The policy behind

Idaho 900, 912, 303 P.3d 587, 599 (2013).
protect the integrity of the judicial system,

justice

by protecting

V.

Ada Cntv., 154

judicial estoppel is to

the orderly administration of

and having regard for the dignity of the judicial proceeding.”

quotations omitted). In short, “[i]t

I_d.

(internal

intended to prevent the parties from playing fast and

is

loose with the legal system.” Li.

This case presents a textbook example of a party “playing fast and loose With the
legal system.”

petition,

Hoagland, 154 Idaho

Hanks took

natural life.”

(R.,

912, 303 P.3d at 599.

at

the position that he

pp.33 1-32.)

And

had been sentenced

that position

went

In a prior post-conviction

to stay in prison for his “full

t0 the heart

0f his prior claim: he

claimed that the length of his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.

(R., pp.328-33.)

That claim undoubtedly packed a more persuasive punch because Hanks took the position
that the length

0f his sentence was his

“full natural life” rather

only been sentenced t0 spend thirty years in prison.
622, 626-27, 851 P.2d 336, 340-41

than the position that he had

E, 1g” State V. Matteson, 123 Idaho

(1993) (explaining that an Eighth

12

Amendment

challenge t0 the length of a sentence requires the court t0 compare the length ofthe sentence
t0 the nature

Now,

of the crime).
in conjunction With this petition for post-conviction relief,

“second position that

incompatible with the

is

first.”

While Hanks’s prior claim centered on

at 599.

Hanks has taken a

Hoagland, 154 Idaho

his position that

at

912, 303 P.3d

he was sentenced t0 his

“full natural life” (R., p.331-32), his current

claim hinges on his position that he was not

sentenced t0 his “full natural

R., pp.1 1-14).

life”

(ﬂ, gg,

Those two positions are—by

deﬁnition—incompatible.
Despite Hanks’s about-face 0n the length 0f his sentence, the district court refused
to

invoke the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel because Hanks’s “prior statements under oath
appear t0 comprise

[did] not

an abuse 0f the

all

the elements ofjudicial estoppel.” (R., p.393.) That

was

district court’s discretion.

The only requirements

that

judicial estoppel are (1) the party

must be satisﬁed before a court invokes the doctrine of
must “advantageously

party must “subsequently seek[] a second position that

Hoagland, 154 Idaho

at

912, 303 P.3d at 599.

As

tak[e]

is

one position” and

(2) the

incompatible with the ﬁrst.”

explained above, those requirements (0r

“elements”) were clearly satisﬁed in this case. The district court either abused its discretion

because

had

t0

it

mistakenly believed there were additional “elements of judicial estoppel” that

be satisﬁed

m,

(R.,

162 Idaho

at

p.393) and thus did not act “consistently with the legal standards,”
608, 402 P.3d at 1061, 0r because

elements had not been satisﬁed and thus failed to reach

“by an exercise of reason.” Watkins, 162 Idaho

13

at

it

mistakenly believed those two

its

decision on judicial estoppel

608, 402 P.3d at 1061.

Hanks argues

that his prior petition for post-conviction relief is not incompatible

With his current petition for post-conviction relief because his prior petition “merely

acknowledged the obvious—that the
his sentence as

district court’s

Rule 35 order and the

one where he was not eligible for parole.” (Appellant’s

ignores the plain language 0f Hanks’s sworn petition and afﬁdavit.

IDOC

treated

brief, p.10.)

That

Hanks’s sworn

afﬁdavit stated, Without mentioning anyone else’s interpretation 0f his sentence, that he

received a “[d]eterminate term of life” and deﬁned “a determinate
natural life 0f the inmate.”

determinate

life

sentence

.

.

.

(R., pp.329-32.)

And Hanks’s

life

term” as “the

full

afﬁdavit stated: “With a

Iwill never be eligible for consideration from the parole and

probation board for parole.” (R., p.336 (emphasis added).) Because Hanks took a position
in this petition that

was incompatible With a

position he took in a prior petition in order t0

gain a legal advantage, the district court abused
judicial estoppel to bar

303 P.3d

its

discretion

Hanks’s post-conviction claim.

E

When

it

refused to invoke

Hoagland, 154 Idaho

at

912,

at 599.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the

dismissing with prejudice Hanks’s petition for post—conviction

district court’s

relief.

DATED this 2nd day of August, 2019.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

14

judgment

CERTEICATE OF SERVICE

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of August, 2019, served a true and
correct copy 0f the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by
I

means of iCourt

File

and Serve:

ROBYN FYFFE
FYFFE LAW, LLC
robm@fyffelaw.com

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
JN/dd

15

